## United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge or Magistrate Judge			I. Shadur	than Assigned Judge				
CASE NUMBER		01 C	4250	DATE	7/31/	2001		
CASE TITLE		William Parker vs. Phillips Chevrolet						
[In the following box (a of the motion being pr		n) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature esented.]						
DOCKET ENTRY:								
(1)	☐ Filed motion of [use listing in "Motion" box above.]							
(2)	☐ Brief	Brief in support of motion due						
(3)	Answer brief to motion due Reply to answer brief due							
(4)	☐ Ruling/Hearing on set for at							
(5)	Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at							
(6)	Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at							
(7)	☐ Trial[set for/re-set for] on at							
(8)	☐ [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at							
(9)		his case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]  FRCP4(m)  General Rule 21  FRCP41(a)(1)  FRCP41(a)(2).						
[Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. This Court therefore continues to await something more from counsel, a matter that may be discussed at the time of the next telephonic status hearing at 8:45 a.m. August 15, 2001.								
(11) For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]								
	No notices required, No notices required.	advised in open court.		ļ		Document Number		
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	Notified counsel by telephone.				JUL 3 1 2001 date docketed			
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## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

WILLIAM PARKER and MELISSA PYTLEWSKI,	)	
Plaintiffs,	ý	
v.	) No.	01 C 4250
PHILLIPS CHEVROLET, INC., GENERAL MOTORS CORP., and FIRSTAR BANK, N.A.,	) ) )	DOCKETED
Defendants.	)	JUL 3 1 2001

## MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

General Motors Corp. ("GM") has filed a motion for its dismissal from this action, in which William Parker and Melissa Pytlewski have sued GM, Phillips Chevrolet, Inc. ("Phillips") and Firstar Bank, N.A., asserting several claims based on plaintiffs' purchase of a used car from Phillips. That purchase, says GM, does not permit an action against it -- GM was admittedly not the seller of the vehicle -- under the Truth In Lending Act.

Plaintiffs' counsel have now responded to this Court's oral inquiry, made when the matter was brought before it on GM's motion, as to what good faith basis exists for alleging that Phillips is an agent of GM in connection with the sale of <u>used</u> cars (as contrasted, for example, with any agency argument based on Phillips' dealer relationship with GM regarding any <u>new</u> cars that GM sells to Phillips). For that purpose counsel points to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Of course Phillips has obtained the used cars that it sells from private parties, either via trade-ins or via purchases from those parties.



opinion by this Court's respected colleague, Honorable Matthew Kennelly, in Kent v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., No. 99 C 2868, 1999 WL 1021044 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3), in which Judge Kennelly ruled (id. at \*3-\*4) that "an automobile dealership may under certain circumstances be an agent of the manufacturer" and that the allegations of the complaint there, read through the generous lens prescribed by Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), were sufficient to keep the plaintiff in court against GM on an agency theory.

But the difficulty with that presentation remains that it is all too easy for a complaint to shape allegations that would survive scrutiny in Fed. R. Civ. P. ("Rule") 12(b)(6) terms, yet have no objective basis for having done so. This Court's oral inquiry of the parties was as to the objective good faith basis that Rule 11 demands of every pleader that would support the agency claim.

It is of course <u>possible</u> that the relationship between a franchised automobile dealer and a manufacturer might contain elements that would sustain the notion that the former is the agent of the latter in conducting used car sales, but that is not in accordance with the general real world understanding of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>This Court regularly cites to <u>Hishon v. King & Spalding</u>, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) for the identical proposition. Although <u>Hishon</u> itself cites <u>Conley</u> as authority, it is a generation younger -- and that helps show that the pleading doctrine referred to in the text remains alive and well and living in Washington.

relationship. This Court therefore continues to await something more from counsel, a matter that may be discussed at the time of the next telephonic status hearing at 8:45 a.m. August 15, 2001.

Milton I. Shadur

Senior United States District Judge

Date: July 31, 2001